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957 
WHAT LEONA HELMSLEY CAN TEACH US ABOUT THE 
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION 
RAY D. MADOFF∗ 
When Leona Helmsley, the New York hotel and real estate heiress, 
died in August 2007, she left a will naming both human and canine benefi-
ciaries. However, one of the unnamed beneficiaries of this estate plan is 
surely the body of scholars interested in studying the role of philanthropy 
in the United States. By directing that an estimated $8 billion be used for 
the benefit of dogs, Mrs. Helmsley brought into high relief policy issues 
regarding the appropriateness of the unlimited charitable deduction, par-
ticularly as it applies to perpetual private foundations. 
INTRODUCTION 
The story of Leona Helmsley is one that seems better suited to the 
pages of a comic book then to a newspaper. During life Leona Helmsley 
had a self-styled regal persona. She and her husband, Harry Helmsley, 
owned a chain of hotels (including the N.Y. Helmsley Palace) and the ad-
vertisement campaign for their empire featured the image of an imperious 
Leona Helmsley overseeing the staff with the tag line: “the only palace 
where the queen stands guard.” She was known as the “Queen of Mean” 
for her domineering ways, and when charged with tax evasion, her convic-
tion (at least in the court of public opinion) was assured when testimony 
was presented that she had said: “only the little people pay taxes.” 
Given her reputation during life, no one was too surprised when, at the 
time of her death, she left a will that disinherited several grandchildren but 
left $12 million for the care of her Maltese terrier—appropriately named 
“Trouble” for his unfortunate propensity to bite people. At the time, disap-
proval of the dog bequest was offset by reports of her apparent generosity 
in leaving the bulk of her estate to her private charitable foundation. How-
ever, criticism again erupted when it was disclosed that she had left instruc-
tions directing that the assets in the private charitable trust be used for the 
care of dogs. (To make matters worse, her instructions originally provided 
 
 ∗ Ray D. Madoff is a Professor of Law at Boston College Law School. She is the author of 
IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW (Yale Univ. Press 2010). Portions of this article are based on this work 
and reproduced here by permission of the publisher. 
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that the money be used “for the care of dogs and of the indigent.” However, 
she reportedly had a last minute change of heart and removed “the indi-
gent” from her beneficiaries.)1 The effect of this plan was that Leona 
Helmsley had directed that as much as eight billion dollars be committed to 
the care of dogs. 
I. THE TROUBLING NATURE OF THE BEQUEST 
What makes this bequest so disconcerting? On the one hand, this be-
quest might be seen as just another example of an exercise of the eccen-
tricities of the super-rich—like Helmsley’s large bequest for the care of her 
own dog, Trouble, or her arrangement to have her grave steam-cleaned 
each year,2 or other expenditures of the super rich like multi-million dollar 
watches or 500-foot yachts that are too large to fit into many harbors. Who 
are we to say how other people should spend their money? However, this 
view misses an important distinction between the Helmsley charitable dog 
bequest and the private yacht: that is, while both involve extravagant ex-
penditures by the wealthy, the private yacht is paid for solely by the person 
buying it, while a significant portion of the Helmsley dog bequest—like 
other philanthropic bequests—is subsidized by the U.S. taxpayer. The rea-
son I say this is because charitable gifts—both during life and at death—are 
examples of tax expenditures. They are functionally the same as other ex-
penditures by the government—like payments for Medicare and Medicaid, 
early childhood education programs or weapons defense programs—
however, the difference is that unlike these traditional government expendi-
tures that are subject to the democratic legislative process, the tax expendi-
tures under the charitable deduction are not. The Leona Helmsley bequest 
affords us the opportunity to consider whether, in these challenging finan-
cial times, it is appropriate for the federal government to continue to give 
wealthy taxpayers a blank check on the federal budget. 
II. CHARITABLE GIVING IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Today charitable giving is deeply favored in the law. However, the 
law governing charitable giving has undergone a dramatic transformation 
over the history of this country. From the early days of the republic through 
much of the nineteenth century, transfers for charitable purposes were 
viewed with suspicion and the law was at times actively hostile to these 
transfers. This aversion was expressed in two forms: (1) state statutes limit-
 
 1. Stephanie Strom, Helmsley Left Dogs Billions in Her Will. N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2008, at A1. 
 2. Id. 
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ing individuals’ ability to make transfers to religious and other charitable 
organizations; and, (2) court decisions preventing individuals from estab-
lishing their own charitable trusts. 
A. Mortmain Statutes 
During the nineteenth century and through much of the twentieth cen-
tury, it was common for states to have statutes allowing spouses and chil-
dren to set aside death bed gifts to religious organizations and other 
charities. These statutes, called mortmain (from the French, meaning “dead 
hand”), restricted charitable giving by either disallowing charitable be-
quests in wills made shortly prior to the donor’s death or by prohibiting 
charitable gifts in excess of a designated fraction of the donor’s estate. 
Mortmain statutes were ostensibly enacted to address the concern that 
as people get closer to death, they may be inclined to direct their estates to 
a religious or charitable organization to ensure their eternal salvation. Thus, 
mortmain statutes were considered to fulfill two purposes: (1) to protect 
testators (as well as their rightful heirs) against the testator’s improvidence; 
and (2) to deter clergy and representatives of other charitable organizations 
from exerting undue influence on the frail and elderly.3 In addition, there 
was undoubtedly some religious bigotry associated with these statutes as 
well. As historian Lawrence Friedman described it, “a faint odor of anti-
Catholicism also hung over these laws—the fantasy of the evil priest, ex-
torting ransom for the Church from the dying man, as the price of absolu-
tion.”4 
Beginning in the 1970’s some states’ mortmain statutes began to be 
successfully challenged on a variety of constitutional grounds and other 
states simply repealed their mortmain statues. As a result, today only Geor-
gia has a mortmain statute still in effect.5 The Georgia statute has very 
narrow applicability. It only applies to wills made within ninety days of the 
person’s death where the person is survived by a spouse or descendants and 
the gift to charity is in excess of one-third of a decedent’s estate.6 Moreover 
the Georgia statute is further limited by not applying to the extent the value 
of the estate exceeds $200,000.7 
 
 3. Kymson F. DesJardins, Mortmain Statutes: Questions of Constitutionality, 52 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 638, 639 (1977). 
 4. LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 185 (2005). 
 5. GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-10 (2007). 
 6. § 53-2-10 (A). 
 7. § 53-2-10 (B). 
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B. The Precarious History of Charitable Trusts 
People often seek to leave instructions in their wills, devoting their 
property to a particular charitable purpose. Beginning in the sixteenth cen-
tury English law allowed these bequests through the device of the charita-
ble trust—the technical term for the situation where a person gives property 
to another with instructions to use that property for a particular charitable 
purpose. Charitable trusts are so ubiquitous and play such a strong role in 
our society that it is hard to believe that for much of the nineteenth century 
American law was hostile to their very existence. However, after the Revo-
lutionary War, American states were in an upheaval over whether they 
should continue to follow the law of England or create a new American law 
that better reflected the values of the new democracy. Because the charita-
ble trust was associated with privilege, the dead hand, and massive wealth 
held in perpetuity, people viewed it with particular suspicion.8 There was 
particular concern about problems that could arise from religious estab-
lishments controlling large amounts of property in perpetuity. As James 
Madison wrote: 
But besides the danger of a direct mixture of Religion [and] the civil 
Government, there is an evil which ought to be guarded agst [sic] in the 
indefinite accumulation of property from the capacity of holding it in 
perpetuity by ecclesiastical corporations. . . . The growing wealth ac-
quired by them never fails to be a source of abuses. A warning on this 
subject is emphatically given in the example of the various Charitable es-
tablishments in G.B. [Great Britain] the management of which has been 
lately scrutinized. The excessive wealth of ecclesiastical Corporations 
and the misuse of it in many Countries of Europe has long been a topic 
of complaint. In some of them the Church has amassed half perhaps of 
the property of the nation. . . . In the U.S. there is a double motive for 
fixing limits in this case, because wealth may increase not only from ad-
ditional gifts, but from exorbitant advances in the value of the primitive 
one. In grants of vacant lands, and of lands in the vicinity of growing 
towns & Cities the increase of value is often such as if foreseen, would 
essential controul [sic] the liberality confirming them.9 
These concerns were not without some merit. In addition to the ex-
periences of Great Britain (where prior to the Reformation much of the 
land was owned by the Church), the history of Mexico also provides an 
example of difficulties that can arise when organizations with perpetual life 
are able to acquire large amounts of land in developing countries. 
 
 8. “In the early nineteenth century, charity was associated with privilege, with the dead 
hand . . . with massive wealth held in perpetuity. None of these was particularly popular.” FRIEDMAN, 
supra note 4, at 185. 
 9. Elizabeth Fleet, Madison’s “Detached Memoranda,” 3 WM. & MARY Q. 534, 556–57 (1946) 
(estimated to have been written by Madison between 1817 and 1832). 
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Catholic missionaries came to Mexico with the sixteenth century 
Spanish conquest. The clergy played a strong role in the communities and it 
was not uncommon for people at death to give large amounts of their land 
to their local churches. Over the centuries, the power of the Catholic 
Church grew along with the Church’s land holdings, to the point where, by 
the mid-nineteenth century, the Church owned half of the land in Mexico.10 
This extensive land ownership by the Church meant that there was less land 
available for private ownership, which in turn inhibited the development of 
a strong middle class.11 The extraordinary wealth of the Church also en-
abled it to play a strong role in the country’s political evolution. The 
Church actively opposed Mexico’s independence from Spain.12 It was only 
after President Benito Juarez seized the Church’s land in the mid-
nineteenth century that the political power of the Church began to diminish. 
In the United States, concern about excess land holding by religious 
and other charitable organizations was addressed by mortmain statutes and 
by judicial resistance to charitable trusts. 
The issue of the validity of charitable trusts in American law came 
about in the wake of the American Revolution when many state legislatures 
struck all British statutes from their laws. These included the English Stat-
ute of Charitable Uses which had explicitly authorized charitable trusts. 
While some states subsequently enacted their own statutes, others did not, 
leaving open the question of whether bequests for charitable purposes 
would be recognized. This issue came before the United States Supreme 
Court in 1819 in the case of Philadelphia Baptist Association v. Hart’s 
Executors.13 
Silas Hart, a Virginia resident who died in 1795, had made a bequest 
in his will to the Baptist Association of Philadelphia.14 Hart’s will directed 
that the bequest was to be used to educate Baptist youth for the ministry. 
Virginia was one of the states that had struck all British laws, without en-
acting its own statute authorizing charitable bequests.15 Thus, the question 
 
 10. Evelyn Brody, Charitable Endowments and the Democratization of Dynasty, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 
873, 914 (1997). 
 11. “The greater became the Church holdings, and they were usually of the best land in a given 
community, the less land was left for the laity to own, and the fewer were the chances that the very 
small incipient middle class would get a foothold.” WILFRED HARDY CALLCOTT, CHURCH AND STATE 
IN MEXICO, 1822–1857, at 14 (Duke U. Press 1926).  
 12. Brody, supra note 10, at 914. 
 13. See MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND 
STATE LAW & REGULATIONS 44–45 (2004); HOWARD MILLER, THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
AMERICAN PHILANTHROPY 1776–1844, 21–23 (1961) (discussing Phila. Baptist Ass’n v. Hart’s Execu-
tors, 17 U.S.1, 2 (1819)). 
 14. Phila. Baptist Ass’n, 17 U.S. at 2. 
 15. Id. at 12–13. 
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before the Court was whether Hart’s wishes would be given effect. While 
the Court noted that Hart’s philanthropic intentions would have been up-
held under the English Statute of Charitable Uses as well as under prior 
Virginia law, the Court ruled that the statute had fallen in December 1792 
when the state legislature struck all statutes or Acts of British Parliament 
from Virginia law and because there was no statute on point authorizing 
charitable trusts, the bequest was set aside and the property was instead 
given to Hart’s heirs.16 Chief Justice Marshall wrote the opinion and Jus-
tice Story concurred. 
Although this decision was rather technical, it was backed by the repu-
tations of Justice Marshall and Justice Story, two of the most influential 
jurists of the era, and had an enormous impact on lower courts, which for 
the next 100 years regularly set aside charitable bequests.17 In this era 
courts were generally suspicious of allowing “every private citizen the right 
to create a perpetuity for such purposes as to him may seem good.”18 In one 
of the most notorious cases, a New York court set aside a four million dol-
lar bequest from Samuel Tilden (former Governor of New York and al-
most-President of the United States) to establish the Tilden Trust to fund a 
public library in New York City.19 The New York courts refused to give 
effect to the bequest and instead awarded the money to Tilden’s heirs.20 
However, there was such a public outcry over this decision that the New 
York legislature responded by enacting the Tilden Act in 1893 validating 
charitable trusts in New York.21 
 
 16. Id. at 51. 
 17.  
“The Hart case was followed in Virginia, Maryland, the District of Columbia, and West Vir-
ginia for nearly one hundred years; and it influenced the development of charitable trusts in 
New York, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota. It had this effect despite the fact that 
twenty-five years later the Supreme Court reversed itself in Vidal v. Girard’s Executors, hold-
ing that charitable trusts should be afforded recognition in the Unites States regardless of stat-
utes abolishing English law.” 
FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 13, at 45. 
 18. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 13, at 45 (citing Bascom v. Albertson, 34 N.Y. 584, 614–15 
(1866)). 
 19. Samuel Tilden was the Al Gore of his day. He was the democratic candidate of 1876, the most 
controversial Presidential election of the nineteenth century. In 1876 Tilden won the popular vote by 
over 250,000 votes, but after months of dispute, the election was ultimately handed over to the republi-
can candidate, Rutherford B. Hayes. Encyclopedia Britannica, Samuel J. Tilden, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/595754/Samuel-J-Tilden (last visited Mar. 21, 2010). 
 20. Tilden v. Green, 28 N.E. 880, 889 (1891). The case is discussed and criticized in LAWRENCE 
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 318 (2005), and in a contemporaneous law review article, 
J. B. Ames, The Failure of the “Tilden Trust,” 5 HARV. L. REV. 389 (1891–1892). 
 21. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 13, at 46–47 n.123 (discussing the Tilden Acts of 1893, ch. 701, 
codified at N.Y. Real Prop. § 113; N.Y. Pers. Prop., § 12).  
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The on-going power of the Hart decision was particularly surprising 
in light of the fact that twenty five years later, in 1844, the Supreme Court 
reversed itself in the case of Vidal v. Girard’s Executors, and held that a 
charitable trust could be upheld even in the face of statutes abolishing Eng-
lish law.22 Yet, it was not until the early years of the twentieth century that 
charitable trusts came to be generally recognized throughout the United 
States.23 
What explains this shift in legal opinion about the validity of charita-
ble trusts? On a doctrinal level, the shift has been explained as a result of a 
deepening understanding of English legal history and the technical question 
of whether charitable trusts were the product of English statutory law 
(which had been repealed in many states post-Revolution) or principles of 
equity and common law (which continued to apply). However, this expla-
nation is incomplete because it fails to take into account the larger social 
context in which this dispute occurred.24 
The late nineteenth century was a time when individuals in the United 
States began amassing wealth at levels that had never before been held in 
private hands. At the same time, it also marked a period of growing aware-
ness of the larger societal ills, particularly those suffered by immigrants in 
the growing American cities. In the end, the combination of societal prob-
lems in need of resources and the possibility of devoting a portion of this 
growing private wealth to the problems of the day outweighed the earlier 
concerns about the unfettered growth of perpetual charitable organizations. 
This transformation was also eased by the fact that the course of the nine-
teenth century also witnessed the proliferation of another entity with per-
petual existence: the corporation. This growing familiarity with perpetual 
organizations in the business context also likely served to decrease people’s 
apprehension regarding perpetual charitable trusts. 
Today, charitable trusts have received both legal and social accep-
tance. Few worry about the societal costs of charitable trusts and large dy-
nastic wealth owned by non-profit organizations (although at $30 billion, 
the wealth of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation is larger than the gross 
domestic product of many countries25). Charitable trusts are touted as a 
win-win, serving the dual purposes of providing resources to address social 
problems as well as giving people a way to “live on” after death. Despite 
 
 22. Vidal v. Girard's Ex'rs, 43 U.S. 127, 196 (1844). 
 23. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 13, at 47. 
 24. MILLER, supra note 13, at 40–41. 
 25. More than seventy as measured by GDP. See CIA—The World Factbook, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2195.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2010). 
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this appeal, charitable trusts are not without their problems, particularly 
those raised by the fact that they exist in perpetuity and that they are heav-
ily subsidized through the tax system. 
III. THE SUBSIDY FOR CHARITABLE GIVING— 
AND SOME OF ITS PROBLEMS 
For most of history, charitable giving has occurred independent of any 
government support. However, for the last century the U.S. government has 
subsidized charitable donations (both while living and at death) through the 
charitable deduction. 
During life, this subsidy is limited as the charitable deduction is only 
available to offset approximately one-half of a person’s taxable income. 
However, there is no such limitation for charitable transfers at death. Any 
individual, no matter how wealthy, is able to avoid all estate taxes by tak-
ing advantage of the unlimited charitable deduction. Because of this, Leona 
Helmsley was effectively able to eliminate most of the tax liability on her 
$5 billion plus estate by transferring the bulk of her assets to the Harry and 
Leona Helmsley Charitable Trust. 
People often think of government expenditures solely in terms of di-
rect monetary outlays by the government for particular programs, like 
Medicaid and Medicare and national defense. However, it has long been 
recognized that another way that the government spends its resources is 
through the tax system.26 Some tax deductions (as well as exclusions and 
credits) can be the equivalent of direct expenditures by the government. 
These are termed “tax expenditures.” As explained by the Senate Budget 
Committee: 
Tax expenditures are revenue losses that occur as a result of Federal tax 
provisions that grant special tax relief to encourage certain kinds of ac-
tivities by taxpayers or to aid taxpayers in special circumstances. These 
provisions are the equivalent of a simultaneous collection of revenue and 
a direct budget outlay of an equal amount . . . .27 
When the government grants tax benefits for money spent purchasing 
a fuel efficient car, it is the same as if the government were assisting the 
purchaser of the car by contributing to the cost of the purchase price. Tax 
 
 26. Leonard E. Burman, Is the Tax Expenditure Concept Still Relevant?, 56 NATIONAL TAX 
JOURNAL 613, 613 (2003), available at http://ntj.tax.org/. 
 27. 122 CONG. REC. S10, 617 (1976) (statement of Sen. Muskie). Since 1974, and pursuant to 
federal law, the Administration has published a list of tax expenditures as part of its annual budget 
submission. However, beginning in 2003, with the quasi-repeal of the estate and gift tax, the Admini-
stration stopped calculating tax expenditures in connection with the estate and gift. Leonard E. Burman, 
Is the Tax Expenditure Concept Still Relevant?, 56 NAT’L TAX J. 613, 614 n.1 (2003). 
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expenditure analysis enables the home mortgage deduction to be appropri-
ately analyzed for what it is: a federal grant to people who take out loans to 
purchase a home that is not available to people who rent or to people who 
own their homes outright. 
In the context of charity, tax expenditures operate like matching 
grants. As one scholar explains: 
The charitable deduction makes the government a partner in every gift-
giving venture; a taxpayer in the (hypothetical, but arithmetically con-
venient) [fifty] percent bracket, for instance, can be seen as joining 
forces with the government to give equal amounts to the cause chosen by 
the taxpayer (with characteristics or minimum qualifications set by the 
government).28 
When a taxpayer who would otherwise be subject to a forty-five per-
cent tax rate makes a deductible transfer of $100 to the American Red 
Cross and gets a reduction in his taxes of forty-five dollars, it is the same as 
if the taxpayer were contributing fifty-five dollars to the Red Cross and 
directing the government to make a matching grant of forty-five dollars to 
the Red Cross. 
The charitable deduction is a particularly costly expenditure. The New 
York Times reported in 2007 that: “[t]he charitable deduction cost the gov-
ernment $40 billion in lost tax revenue last year, according to the Joint 
Committee on Taxation, more than the government spends altogether on 
managing public lands, protecting the environment and developing new 
energy sources.”29 
Saul Levmore supports the charitable deduction as an efficient way for 
the government to get information from the populace regarding which pro-
grams it ought to support. He analogizes the charitable deduction to the 
taxpayer check off regarding financing elections, but regards the charitable 
deduction as superior because it is likely to reflect a more thoughtful choice 
since it requires a cash outlay by the donor. 
While the charitable deduction does provide some information to the 
government about how some taxpayers would like to direct governmental 
resources, there are nonetheless serious policy concerns with using this as a 
directive for governmental expenditures, particularly in the estate tax con-
text. 
Most significantly, the matching grant program is only available to the 
charitable donations of the very wealthy. For income tax purposes, it only 
applies to those who itemize their deductions and for gift and estate tax 
 
 28. Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 387, 405 (1998) (footnote omitted). 
 29. Stephanie Strom, Big Gifts, Tax Breaks and a Debate on Charity, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2007, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/06/business/06giving.html.  
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purposes, it only applies to individuals with estates that are larger than $3.5 
million (the exemption amount for 2009). Thus, if a person with a multi-
million dollar estate, subject to a forty-five percent tax, makes a $100,000 
charitable donation, that donation is functionally equivalent to the donor 
making a $55,000 donation and the federal government making a $45,000 
donation to the charity chosen by the wealthy donor. However, if that same 
$100,000 donation is made by someone who is not otherwise subject to the 
estate tax (because her estate is less than $3.5 million in 2009) then the 
charitable bequest offers no financial benefit to the donor’s estate, and 
there is no functional federal contribution to the donor’s chosen charity. In 
this way, the matching grant program is highly distorted because it only 
takes into account the preferences of the wealthiest Americans. 
This matching grant for the preferences of the wealthy is particularly 
troubling due to the fact that wealthy Americans tend to make very differ-
ent types of bequests than their countrymen. While most Americans direct 
their charitable dollars to religious organizations, approximately three quar-
ters of all bequests reported on estate tax returns go either to private foun-
dations or educational institutions.30 This type of giving by the wealthy 
raises the question of whether the charitable deduction is the most efficient 
use of taxpayer dollars as charitable gifts to private foundations and educa-
tional institutions each raise policy concerns. 
Private foundations receive almost half of all charitable bequests. 
They are a form of charitable trusts that do not generally engage in charita-
ble work themselves, but instead dispense a portion of their assets each 
year to support the work of other charitable organizations. The vast major-
ity of private foundations are designed to exist in perpetuity and therefore 
only spend a small portion of their asset value each year on charitable en-
deavors. Thus, although a taxpayer transferring one million to his charita-
ble foundation will get an up front deduction worth $450,000 (effectively a 
$450,000 matching grant from the federal government), the foundation will 
only be required to spend about $50,000 each year. Since this $50,000 is 
just as likely to be spent on administrative expenses as it is on charitable 
grants, this further lessens the likelihood of charities ever receiving the full 
benefit of the one million dollars. 
The second largest recipient of beneficence from wealthy individuals 
is educational institutions. While education plays an important role for all 
sectors of society, the allocation of resources by the wealthy raises other 
issues. Rather than distributing this wealth broadly, a disproportionate 
 
 30. GIVING USA 74–75 (2007). 
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share of these bequests goes to a small number of selective, socially pres-
tigious schools. Professor Miranda Perry calculates that  
[Twenty-five] elite private colleges and universities (out of almost 1,700 
private colleges and universities) and ten socially prestigious private 
primary or secondary schools (out of over 27,000 such institutions) re-
ceived approximately [twenty-six percent] of all education bequests re-
ported on 2005 estate tax returns.31 
It is unlikely that the population as a whole would support federal matching 
grants for Exeter Academy, while so many public schools are failing to 
meet the needs of the larger population. Professor Rob Reich has argued 
that this type of educational philanthropy can actually impose a societal 
detriment by increasing the gap between the wealthy and the poor, particu-
larly in the context of education.32 
Finally, even when charitable dollars are oriented towards the truly 
needy it is still questionable whether we really want private individuals 
effectively directing so much federal resources toward their chosen causes. 
The Gates Foundation gives a significant amount of its grants to improve 
the lives of the poor in developing countries. While this is important work, 
the effect of the charitable deduction is that “the American public effec-
tively underwrote several billion dollars worth of foreign aid by private 
individuals, even though poll after poll shows Americans are at best am-
bivalent about using tax dollars in such assistance.”33 
IV. THE PARTICULAR PROBLEM OF PERPETUAL PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS 
The subsidy for charitable deduction is particularly troubling as it ap-
plies to perpetual private foundations (like the Harry and Leona Helmsley 
Trust). Private foundations are the most common recipient of charitable 
bequests. Private charitable foundations have made many important contri-
butions, and my complaint is not with the organizations per se. Rather, my 
concern is that the law governing these private charitable foundations is 
more concerned with allowing these organizations to achieve perpetual 
existence then it has been with ensuring that they serve their charitable 
goals. 
Private charitable foundations are a form of charitable trust that do not 
engage in charitable activities directly, but merely hold money for disbursal 
 
 31. Miranda Perry Fleischer, Charitable Contributions in an Ideal Estate Tax, 60 TAX L. REV. 
263, 303 (2007) (footnotes omitted). 
 32. See generally Rob Reich, A Failure of Philanthropy: American Charity Shortchanges the 
Poor, and Public Policy is Partly to Blame, STANFORD SOC. INNOVATION REV. 24 (2005), available at 
http://www.ssireview.org/images/articles/2005WI_Feature_Reich.pdf. 
 33. Strom, supra note 29.  
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to other organizations that do. In addition, a private foundation is typically 
funded by a small number of people. The Bill and Melinda Gates Founda-
tion, the Ford Foundation and the John D. and Catharine T. MacArthur 
Foundation are examples of some of the largest private charitable founda-
tions, but there are many smaller ones as well. Private charitable founda-
tions, like other charitable trusts, are not subject to any time limitation. 
Federal tax law encourages donations to these perpetual entities by 
granting an up-front deduction for the full amount of money transferred to 
the foundation, even though there may be a significant lag time before the 
money is eventually disbursed for charitable purposes. How much lag time 
is there between the time of the deduction and the time of the distribution 
for charitable use? A lot. These organizations are only required to spend 
five percent of their asset value each year. Moreover, in meeting this five 
percent minimum, foundations are allowed to count trustees’ salaries and 
other administrative expenses as part of their charitable spending. Thus, if 
the assets of the foundation are valued at one million dollars, the trustees 
are only obligated to spend $50,000 each year. Moreover, since administra-
tive expenses, including trustees’ salaries, also count towards this mini-
mum, if the trustees are making an annual salary of $30,000 and the trust 
has $10,000 of other annual administrative expenses (such as rent or legal 
or accounting fees), the trust need only commit $10,000 of trust assets to 
charitable purpose each year. Yet the full one million still qualified for the 
charitable deduction at the time of transfer. 
The value of the five percent rule is that provided the charitable foun-
dation can earn a rate of return of at least five percent, the principal can be 
preserved and the organization can be assured of perpetual life. However, 
the cost of this perpetual life is that fewer dollars are being currently spent 
on charitable purposes. In 2003 legislation was proposed that would have 
required foundations to devote the full five percent of asset value towards 
true charitable expenditures barring foundations from counting operating 
expenses (like rent and salaries) towards the five percent minimum. If that 
law had passed, then a trust with a value of one million dollars would have 
been required to devote the full $50,000 to charity in order for transfers to 
that trust to qualify for the charitable deduction. But private foundations 
successfully fought this legislation by arguing that its effect would be to 
destroy perpetual life for charitable trusts. The argument was that if they 
only earned six percent each year and they had administrative expenses of 
two percent, then the obligation to spend five percent on charitable giving 
would reduce their capital and could eventually deplete their resources to 
nothing. The lobbying was successful and the bill did not pass. 
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V. PROBLEMS WITH PERPETUAL CHARITABLE TRUSTS 
The perpetual charitable trust has such a presence in our society that it 
is hard to imagine any other type of charitable giving. However, periodi-
cally throughout both English and American history, people have ques-
tioned the value of establishing charitable trusts in perpetuity. Professor 
Evelyn Brody has traced some of these critiques.34 
The author Anthony Trollope illustrated the corruption and waste that 
can come from perpetual charitable trusts in his 1855 novel The Warden 
which describes a medieval trust established in 1434 for the support of 12 
retired wool-carders (a wool carder was a person who cleaned wool in 
preparation for spinning). Trollope describes how, while the value of the 
trust grew enormously over the years, the purposes for which it had been 
established did not—particularly since wool-carders had been replaced by 
machines in the prior century. Moreover, Trollope illustrates how through 
time, the true beneficiaries were the trustees who received management 
fees far greater than the amount afforded the so-called beneficiaries of the 
trust. 
In the year 1434 there died at Barchester one John Hiram, who had made 
money in the town as a woolstapler, and in his will he left the house in 
which he died and certain meadows and closes near the town . . . for the 
support of twelve superannuated wool-carders . . . . From that day to this 
the charity had gone on and prospered—at least, the charity had gone on, 
and the estates had prospered. Wool-carding in Barchester there was no 
longer any; so the bishop, dean, and warden . . . generally appointed 
some hangers-on of their own; worn-out gardeners, decrepit grave-
diggers, or octogenarian sextons, who thankfully received a comfortable 
lodging, and one shilling and fourpence a day, such being the stipend to 
which, under the will of John Hiram, they were declared to be entitled.35 
In 1880 the English reformer Courtney Kenny wrote an essay outlin-
ing the fundamental problems with perpetual charitable trusts. Kenny be-
gan with his observation that perpetuity creates the paradox “that whilst 
charity tends to do good, perpetual [c]harities tend to do evil.”36 The main 
problem with perpetual endowments for charities lies in “the inevitable 
tendency of endowed charities to be either neglected or perverted as time 
runs on. Hence it is utterly inexpedient to narrow their resources during 
their youth, for the purpose of augmenting their superfluities in their de-
crepitude.”37 
 
 34. Brody, supra note 10, at 917–19. 
 35. Id. at 898 (citation omitted).  
 36. Id. at 919 (citation omitted).  
 37. Id. (citation omitted). 
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In the United States, Julius Rosenwald, who has been described as 
“the greatest twentieth-century donor you’ve never heard of,” has made the 
most forceful arguments against perpetual charitable endowments.38 Julius 
Rosenwald made his wealth as one of the early owners and developers of 
the Sears Roebuck Company. Rosenwald, like many other titans of wealth, 
in the later part of his life, became a philanthropist. Through his philan-
thropic work, Rosenwald was responsible for the establishment of 5,357 
schools to serve rural Black communities in the South. He also donated 
large amounts of money to the University of Chicago and was the major 
contributor to the Chicago’s Museum of Science and Industry (and resisted 
attempts to have the building named the Rosenwald Museum). However, 
unlike other philanthropists of his day, Rosenwald was adamantly opposed 
to making his charitable grants in perpetuity. When he gave $2 million 
dollars to the University of Chicago, he did so only on the condition that 
the money not be added to the University’s endowment (the University 
instead created a special account for the Rosenwald donations which was 
exhausted by 1942). When he established his private foundation, he in-
cluded a provision in the trust that all assets must be spent within 25 years 
after his death. In the end, the Rosenwald Fund had donated over $70 mil-
lion to public schools, colleges and universities, museums, Jewish charities 
and black institutions before funds were completely depleted in 1948. 
In addition to engaging in his own philanthropy, Rosenwald had an-
other personal mission—to discourage other philanthropists from tying up 
their philanthropic bequests in perpetuity. Rosenwald laid out his argu-
ments in a series of articles beginning with an article published in the At-
lantic Monthly in 1929 entitled “Principles of Public Giving.” This article 
has been described as the most important article written by a philanthropist 
since Andrew Carnegie wrote “The Gospel of Wealth” in 1889. 
In urging his fellow philanthropists not to tie up their wealth in perpe-
tuity, Rosenwald directly took on people’s desire to preserve their reputa-
tions in perpetuity: 
I am certain that those who seek by perpetuities to create for themselves 
a kind of immortality on earth will fail, if only because no institution and 
no foundation can live forever. If some men are remembered years and 
centuries after the death of their last contemporaries, it is not because of 
endowments they created. The names of Harvard, Yale, Bodley, and 
Smithson, to be sure, are still on men’s lips, but the names are now not 
 
 38. Martin Morse Wooster, The Greatest 20th-Century Donor You’ve Never Heard of, 
PHILANTHROPY MAGAZINE, May/June 2006, available at 
http://www.philanthropyroundtable.org/article.asp?article=1219. In writing this document, while Mi-
crosoft Word easily recognizes the names of the other well-known philanthropists, it suggests alternate 
spellings for Rosenwald. 
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those of men but of institutions. If any of these men strove for everlast-
ing remembrance, they must feel kinship with Nesselrode, who lived a 
diplomat, but is immortal as a pudding.39 
What is wrong with perpetual charitable giving? At first glance, per-
petual charitable giving appears to be ideal. After all if charitable giving is 
good, isn’t it even better for there to be more of it? However, the problem 
with this analysis is that it is based on two false premises: the first is that 
giving in perpetuity creates more total charitable dollars than giving out-
right, and the second is that people can address problems in the future as 
effectively as they can address problems in their own time. Both of these 
assumptions are questionable. 
Many people undoubtedly choose to establish perpetual charitable 
trusts on the assumption that more philanthropic dollars will ultimately be 
available by spending only income and preserving the principal in perpetu-
ity. It is not surprising that people would assume that an infinite stream of 
payments (which is provided by setting aside principal and only spending 
income) is ultimately going to be greater than immediately spending the 
underlying income, and anyone familiar with the story of the goose that 
laid the golden eggs knows the importance of preserving principal. How-
ever, fairy tales notwithstanding, this assumption of relative economic val-
ues does not necessarily hold true because it fails to take into account the 
time value of money. The time value of money reflects the fact that be-
cause of lost earning capacity, a dollar one year from now is worth less 
than a dollar today. In many cases, setting principal aside and spending 
only income (even in perpetuity) produces less overall wealth than spend-
ing principal today. 
Consider the example of a person with one million dollars to commit 
to charity. If it is spent immediately then society gets the immediate full 
value of the one million dollars. What if instead the one million is set aside 
in a charitable trust earning five percent each year and the trust commits to 
spend all of its income on charitable endeavors (leaving aside the issue that 
it would likely need to spend a portion of that income to ongoing admini-
stration costs). After how much time will the charities get the one million 
dollars? Initially one might be inclined to think that it takes twenty years of 
$50,000 payments to equal $1 million. However, this fails to take into ac-
count the time value of money and the fact that each $50,000 payment is 
worth less in current dollars as each year passes. Thus, if $50,000 were to 
be paid one year from now (as opposed to today), and if the rate of inflation 
 
 39. Julius Rosenwald, Principles of Public Giving, 143 THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY 599, 605 
(1929). 
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was five percent, then that $50,000 one year from now would only be 
worth $47,619 in today’s dollars. The $50,000 distributed two years from 
now is only worth $45,351 in today’s dollars. How long does it take for the 
sum of these annual payments to equal one million dollars in today’s dol-
lars? Surprisingly, the sum of payments will never equal the present value 
of one million dollars. After 100 years the sum of the present value of the 
annual payments is about $940,000 but due to the diminished present value 
of payouts made way in the future, the next 100 years only adds $10,000 in 
value in today’s dollars and no matter how far into the future you go, the 
sum never equals the value of one million dollars today. 
In addition to the limited economic value of perpetual charitable giv-
ing, there is another more deep-rooted problem. The perpetual charitable 
trust is founded on an assumption that people can make intelligent deci-
sions about the use of resources in the distant future. It is not surprising that 
people would have this perception. The psychologist Daniel Gilbert has 
explained how humans are hard-wired to make decisions on the assumption 
that the future is going to be essentially the same as the present (or in the 
words of Dan Quisenberry—the future is the same as the present, only 
longer). Yet, by looking back in time we can see how flawed this thinking 
is. Imagine the smartest person living 500 years ago (Leonardo da Vinci 
perhaps)—is there any question that no matter how extraordinarily smart 
that person was in their own time, their ability to make an intelligent allo-
cation of resources in the twenty-first century would be extremely limited? 
Now extend that even further back to 1,000 or 2,000 years ago. Does it 
really make sense for current policy to be dictated by plans established by 
someone living in the year 500? Yet that is precisely the situation that we 
are dictating for the future with perpetual charitable trusts. 
Of course, this inquiry highlights the fundamental flaw of these per-
petual entities. Namely, they are based on an assumption that the United 
States and its current system of laws will continue to exist in perpetuity. 
And yet, in the history of mankind, few empires have lasted even 1,000 
years, let alone 10,000 or 100,000. 
Meanwhile, there are serious consequences to this system that encour-
ages saving for tomorrow (and the next century and next millennia) instead 
of spending for today. Real problems are not being adequately addressed. 
Environmental degradation, issues of war and peace, hunger, infectious 
diseases, education and multi-generational cycles of substance abuse and 
poverty are all issues that are in need of immediate resources. Yet, in pur-
suit of perpetuity, fewer resources are being devoted to these pressing is-
sues. 
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Who benefits from this choice to direct charitable dollars to perpetual 
trusts instead of outright charitable gifts? The biggest beneficiaries are the 
trustees who are paid large trustee salaries and the supporting institutions, 
like banks and other financial services companies, who are paid fees for 
managing this accumulating wealth. 
Many people are surprised to learn that people often receive payment 
for serving on the board of directors of private foundations, (particularly in 
light of the hundreds of thousands of less well off Americans who donate 
their time to serve on the boards of non-profit organizations). These fees 
can be substantial—it is not uncommon for a trustee of a private foundation 
to be paid $100,000 annually. A 2003 study analyzing tax returns of 238 
private foundations revealed that in a single year, these organizations spent 
nearly $45 million on trustee fees—the bulk of which was paid to their own 
predominantly wealthy boards of directors. For some of these trusts, the 
money spent on trustee fees and other administrative expenses exceeded 
the amount spent on charitable endeavors.40 
In addition to trustees, the other beneficiaries of perpetual charitable 
trusts are banks and financial service companies. Assuming a modest one 
percent fee, the $600 billion dollars that is currently in private foundations 
generates over $6 billion in management fees every year. While perpetual 
charitable foundations may provide a bad deal for society, they provide 
inordinate benefits to the financial services industry in the form of perpet-
ual management fees. 
Despite these problems, perpetual charitable organizations continue to 
be the preferred format for charitable giving. When people establish chari-
table foundations, they most commonly do so in perpetuity. In a 2004 sur-
vey of private foundations, only nine percent of the respondents said that 
their foundation would not exist in perpetuity.41 This could be intentional 
on behalf of donors (an explicit desire to have their foundations address the 
problems of tomorrow as well as today), or perhaps it is because when they 
seek professional advice, the perpetual foundation is the one most likely to 
be presented to them. Regardless of the motivation, the results are undispu-
table—the vast majority of charitable foundations are established in perpe-
tuity and American law does nothing to discourage this. 
 
 40. Christine Ahn et al., Foundation Trustee Fees: Use and Abuse, The Center for Public and 
Nonprofit Leadership, Georgetown Public Policy Institute (September 2003), 
http://cpnl.georgetown.edu/doc_pool/TrusteeFees.pdf. 
 41. Renée A. Irvin, Endowments: Stable Largesse or Distortion of the Polity?, 67 PUB. ADMIN. 
REV. 445, 445 (2007). 
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Nonetheless, there has been some notable and powerful dissent from 
the tide of perpetuities. When Warren Buffet committed to contribute 
roughly $30 billion to the largest private foundation in existence—The Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation—he did so on the condition that none of the 
donations be added to principle and all of Buffet’s contributions be spent 
within one year of contribution.42 Moreover, the Gates Foundation itself 
recently amended its charter to provide that it would end within fifty years 
after the death of the last of its trustees, Bill Gates, Melinda Gates or War-
ren Buffet. 
There are a number of ways in which the law could be revised to make 
private foundations less focused on their perpetual existence and more re-
sponsive to societal needs. First, the law could require (as was proposed in 
2003) that the five percent minimum payout rules must be satisfied with 
transfers to charity and not trustee fees and other administrative expenses. 
This would discourage private foundations from spending such a signifi-
cant portion of their annual expenditures on administrative expenses. More 
directly the tax law could provide explicit limitations on the duration of 
private foundations or could provide that donors do not get their charitable 
deduction until the money is actually transferred for charitable purpose. 
Regardless of the method chosen, until the law takes a more concerted step 
to discourage perpetuities, we can expect more charitable dollars to be 
committed to perpetuating their own existence rather than toward their 
stated charitable goals. 
 
 
 42. Buffet gave them ten years to disburse money from transfers made upon Buffet’s death. See 
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Implementing Warren Buffett’s Gift, 
http://www.gatesfoundation.org/about/pages/implementing-warren-buffetts-gift.aspx (last visited Mar. 
21, 2010). 
